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NOTE
THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT AND THE REVISED CEQ
REGULATIONS: A FATE WORSE THAN
THE "WORST CASE ANALYSIS?"
When a federal agency proposes a project that will signifi-
cantly affect the quality of the human environment, the agency
must prepare an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS").1 The
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982). Section 4332(C) calls for agencies to:
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would
be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id.
The EIS details environmental impacts, reasonable alternatives and economic costs and
benefits. See Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 123 (D.C. Cir.
1985); Comment, Offshore Oil Development and the Demise of NEPA, 7 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L
.REv 83, 83 (1978). The EIS need not be prepared when a project is merely contemplated,
but must be prepared when a project is proposed, Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/
Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 146 (1981), that is, an EIS must be prepared prior to
taking any action on the project. Id.
Alternate affirmative measures undertaken by an agency may eliminate the necessity
for preparing an EIS. For example, an EIS is not required where "specific mitigation mea-
sures ... completely compensate for any possible adverse environmental impacts stemming
from the original proposal." Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976,
987 (9th Cir. 1985)(citing Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 682
(D.C. Cir. 1982)).
In addition, the preparation of an Environmental Assessment ("EA"), 40 C.F.R. §
1508.9 (1985), briefly outlining the reasons why an EIS is unnecessary will suffice in some
cases. See Catholic Action, 454 U.S. at 141. The purpose of an EA is to determine whether a
formal EIS is required. Id. at n.1; River Rd. Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of United
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EIS must discuss environmental impacts and unavoidable adverse
environmental effects that will result from the proposed action.2
Alternatives to the project must be considered.3 In addition, the
EIS must examine the relationship between short-term uses of the
environment and long-term environmental productivity, 4 as well as
any irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources result-
ing from the proposal.5 Agencies proposing projects that will affect
the environment clearly have a duty to disclose all known environ-
mental effects of the project in an EIS. This duty is not as clear,
however, when uncertainty exists as to what the impacts of the
project will be or when the information necessary for such a deter-
mination is unavailable.
In the past, when faced with such uncertainty, the Council on
States Army, 764 F.2d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1985). In some
cases, the impact may not warrant the time and expense of preparing a formal EIS. See id.
The EA allows the agency to consider environmental concerns while reserving agency re-
sources to prepare full EIS's for appropriate cases. Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of
Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1985). When examining an EA, the reviewing court
must determine whether the EA contains the type of reasoned elaboration required to sup-
port the finding that an EIS is not required. See Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d
29, 35 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984).
2 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i), (ii) (1982). The environmental impacts to be discussed in an
EIS include health, socio-economic, and cumulative impacts. NRDC v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom., Baltimore
Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983). It is the obligation of the federal agency to
obtain information concerning the environmental consequences of proposed action. Id. at
479 n.101.
3 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii) (1982). When considering proposed alternatives to a project,
"it is the party seeking to invalidate an EIS, not the agency, which has the burden of proof"
as to whether the agency's proposed alternatives were reasonable or not. Texas Comm. on
Natural Resources v. Marsh, 736 F.2d 262, 270 (5th Cir. 1984) (emphasis omitted).
- 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iv) (1982). The process provided by the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA") is intended to aid public officials in making decisions which
protect, restore, and enhance natural resources. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (1985).
' 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(v) (1982). Nuclear waste is a prime example of an "irreversible
and irretrievable commitment of resources." See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 539 (1978).
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982). The EIS must discuss "any adverse environmental
effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16
(1985). Where scientific evidence concerning environmental impacts is known, there is no
need for a worst case analysis. Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 589 F. Supp.
113, 116 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
7 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1982). The "worst case analysis" requirement
sets forth a procedure for addressing scientific uncertainty in the preparation of an EIS. See
San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 751 F.2d '1287, 1302
(D.C. Cir. 1984). Because the worst case analysis is specifically designed to cope with the
problem of scientific uncertainty, its provisions are triggered only when such uncertainty
exists. See id.
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Environmental Quality ("CEQ") 8 has required the agency to pre-
pare a "worst case analysis."9 Initially, the worst case analysis reg-
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1982). The CEQ, instituted by NEPA and charged with the
duty of overseeing the implementation of NEPA, develops guidelines to aid federal agencies
in assessing the environmental impacts of proposals. See National Environmental Policy
Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618, 15,619 (1986)
[hereinafter Amendment]. In 1977, by executive order, the CEQ was delegated the duty to
promulgate binding regulations implementing the procedural requirements of NEPA. Id.
CEQ was to "make the environmental impact statement process more useful to deci-
sionmakers and the public; and to reduce paperwork and the accumulation of extraneous
background data, in order to emphasize the need to focus on real environmental issues and
alternatives." Id.
The duties of CEQ are multifarious. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of
Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (CEQ established to resolve interagency disputes
over proposed federal actions); Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1461 (9th Cir. 1984)
(promulgate uniform, mandatory regulations for implementing procedural provisions of
NEPA), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2344 (1985). Its present duties include: monitoring federal
agency compliance with the regulations, reviewing court interpretations of the regulations,
requesting public comment, holding public meetings, and issuing guidelines interpreting the
regulations. See Proposed Amendment to 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22, 50 Fed. Reg. 32,234, 32,234
(1985)[hereinafter Proposed Amendment].
See Proposed Amendment, supra note 8, at 32,236. The worst case analysis is an
assessment of possible worst case impacts based on certain assumptions regarding gaps in
available scientific data. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 347 (D.D.C.
1980). This regulation requires federal agencies to include in an EIS a discussion of possible
adverse effects which will have a significant impact on the environment. Note, NEPA's
Worst Case Analysis Requirement: Cornerstone or Stumbling Block, 25 NAT. REsOURCES J.
495, 501-02 (1985).
The CEQ has stated that "[e]arly in the history of interpreting NEPA, it was decided
that an agency cannot avoid drafting an EIS because some information regarding the poten-
tial environmental impacts is unknown; indeed, 'one of the functions of a NEPA statement
is to indicate the extent to which environmental effects are essentially unknown.'" Id. (cit-
ing Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079,
1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
Until recently, in such circumstances of uncertainty, the CEQ provided for a worst case
analysis. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1985). Section 1502.22 stated:
When an agency is evaluating significant adverse effects on the human envi-
ronment in in environmental impact statement and there are gaps in relevant
information or scientific uncertainty, the agency shall always make clear that such
information is lacking or that uncertainty exists.
(a) If the information relevant to adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned
choice among alternatives and is not known and the overall costs of obtaining it
are not exorbitant, the agency shall include the information in the environmental
impact statement.
(b) If (1) the information relevant to adverse impacts is essential to a rea-
soned choice among alternatives and is not known and the overall costs of ob-
taining it are exorbitant or (2) the information relevant to adverse impacts is im-
portant to the decision and the means for obtaining it are beyond the state of the
art the agency shall weigh the need for the action against the risk and severity of
possible adverse impact were the action to proceed in the face of uncertainty. If
the agency proceeds, it shall include a worst case analysis and an indication of the
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ulation was thought of as permissive rather than mandatory. 0 By
executive order in 1977,11 however, the regulation became binding
on all federal agencies. 12 In recent years, the worst case analysis
has been the subject of much criticism.'3 In response to this criti-
cism, the CEQ has recently removed the worst case analysis en-
tirely from its regulation addressing unavailable or incomplete
information.14
This Note will discuss the worst case analysis, its criticism,
and its ultimate survival despite such criticism. In addition, it will
analyze the CEQ's recent revision of the regulation regarding the
worst case analysis. In surveying the requirements and policies un-
derlying the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA")
and the case law surrounding the worst case analysis, this Note will
probability or improbability of its occurrence.
Id.
1" See Roady, The 1979 Council on Environmental Quality Regulations Under the
NEPA, 54 FLA. B. J. 155, 155 (1980); Stevens, The Council on Environmental Quality's
Guidelines and Their Influence on the National Environmental Policy Act, 23 CATH. U.L.
REV. 547, 551 (1974); Comment, Scientific Uncertainty and the National Environmental
Policy Act - The Council on Environmental Quality's Regulation 40 C.F.R. Section
1502.22, 60 WASH. L. REv. 101, 102 (1984) (citing W. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §
708 (1977).
" Executive Order No. 11,991, 3 C.F.R. 124 (1978). In 1970, President Nixon directed
the CEQ "to issue guidelines to assist federal agencies in developing their own procedures
for environmental analysis of the projects for which they were responsible." Roady, supra
note 10, at 155 (citing Executive Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 902 (1970)). This order resulted
in a variety of interpretations "and in turn spawned much litigation charging that various
agencies had failed to follow the mandates of the Act or the spirit of the guidelines." Id.
In response to this confusion, President Carter ordered federal agencies to comply with
the regulations promulgated by the CEQ. See id. (citing Executive Order No. 11,991, 3
C.F.R. 124 (1978)). The executive order directed the CEQ to make the environmental im-
pact statement more useful in deciding environmental issues. See id. The President's au-
thority to order the CEQ to issue binding guidelines for federal agencies has not been ques-
tioned by the Supreme Court despite the absence of specific statutory language authorizing
the CEQ to do so. Id.
Executive approval of the CEQ has waned in recent years. In 1981, President Reagan
engaged in CEQ staff firings and budget cuts. See McCrea, Annual Review of Significant
Developments - 1981, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 275, 290 (1982). During 1981, the White House
directed the head of the CEQ to fire almost its entire staff. Id. (citation omitted). The Rea-
gan Administration reduced the CEQ's budget 66 percent from $3.3 million to $0.9 million.
Id.
*12 See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 356-58 (1979); Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772
F.2d 1225, 1236 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 972 (5th Cir.
1983)); National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States Forest Serv., 592 F. Supp. 931, 942 (D. Or.
1984); Proposed Amendment, 50 Fed. Reg., supra note 8, at 32,235.
11 See infra notes 24 to 33 and accompanying text.
14 See Amendment, 51 Fed. Reg. supra note 8, at 15,621; infra note 38 (full text of
amended regulation).
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conclude that there is no substantive difference between the old
and newly revised regulations. The worst case analysis is still re-
quired when a federal agency is faced with unavailable or incom-
plete information when preparing an EIS.
THE WORST CASE ANALYSIS
The worst case analysis is the part of the EIS process whereby
an agency discusses the worst possible scenario that may result
from a proposed action together with the probability of its occur-
rence."5 Such an analysis has been performed on a wide variety of
environmental issues ranging from the operation of nuclear power
plants and storage of nuclear waste, to the use of pesticides and
toxic chemicals and the construction of highways.' 6 Section 1502.22
of the CEQ regulations, which required the worst case analysis,
was specifically designed to cope with the problem of scientific un-
certainty regarding the impacts of a project, and therefore, was
triggered only in those cases where such uncertainty existed.' 7
Several threshold questions were to be addressed by the
agency proceeding in the face of uncertainty prior to including a
worst case analysis in an EIS. 18 The agency first had to determine
whether the missing information was essential to the decision mak-
ing process.' 9 The agency was then required to decide whether the
information was unobtainable or whether the overall cost of ob-
taining such information was exorbitant.20 If these questions were
answered in the affirmative, and the agency nevertheless decided
" See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 772 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d
Cir. 1985) (construction of highway); Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760
F.2d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1985) (land development project); San Luis Obispo Mothers for
Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (nuclear power plant operation); Save
Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1984) (herbicide spraying); Oregon
Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 614 F. Supp. 657, 658 (D. Or. 1986) (pesticide spraying).
11 See San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287, 1302 (D.C. Cir.
1984), vacated, 760 F2d 1320 (1985); see also Southern Or. Citizens Against Toxic Sprays,
Inc. v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir. 1983) (uncertainty must be exposed), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 446 (1984); Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 614 F. Supp. 657, 665 (D.
Or. 1985) (worst case analysis required where relevant information on health risks lacking);
North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 346 (D. D.C. 1980) (worst case analysis
needed where gaps in available information), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States Forest Serv., 592 F. Supp. 931, 943 (D.
Or. 1984) (worst case analysis required where uncertainty exists).
" See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1985).




to proceed with the project, a worst case analysis was to be in-
cluded in the EIS.21
The CEQ's regulation requiring a worst case analysis has been
embraced by courts as necessary to ensure that agencies consider
environmental issues before undertaking projects, and to guarantee
that the public is fully informed of the consequences of such
projects.22 Although courts have afforded CEQ regulations great
deference, 23 much controversy has surrounded the worst case anal-
ysis despite the support of the courts.2 4
Criticism of the Worst Case Analysis
Varied interpretations of the worst case analysis have followed
the promulgation of section 1502.22.25 Substantial litigation has
also been subsequently generated concerning the types of risks to
be discussed, and the probability of the occurrence of those risks.26
A number of courts have extended the worst case analysis to situa-
tions where the impacts were catastrophic but where the probabili-
21 See id. § 1502.22(b)(2).
22 See San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. National Regulatory Comm'n, 751 F.2d
1287, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir.
1984); National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States Forest Serv., 592 F. Supp. 931, 943 (D. Or.
1984).
23 See, e.g., Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) (CEQ regulations entitled
to substantial deference); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Schlesinger, 404
U.S. 917, 920 (1971) (appendix to opinion of Douglas, J.) (consult CEQ regulations when
preparing EIS); Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1461 (9th Cir. 1984) (court must see
whether agency complied with CEQ regulations), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2344 (1985); Ore-
gon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 614 F. Supp. 657, 659 (D. Or. 1985); see also Note, Sixth
Circuit Narrows Definition of "Wetlands" for Purpose of Corps of Engineers Jurisdiction,
25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 480, 503 (1985) (courts hold CEQ regulations entitled to substantial
deference).
24 See Proposed Amendment, supra note 8, at 32,236; infra notes 25 to 33 and accom-
panying text.
21 See, e.g., Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 587
(9th Cir. 1985) (potential risks to water quality from landslides); City of N.Y. v. United
States Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 747 (2d Cir. 1983) (worst case from trucking accident
involving plutonium would include latent cancer fatalities, early morbidities, and land dam-
ages), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984); Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 969 (5th Cir.
1983) (worst case is total cargo loss by oil supertanker); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642
F.2d 589, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (worst case is major oil spill).
26 See, e.g., City of N.Y. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 747 (2d Cir.
1983) (despite seriousness of worst case, very low probability of occurrence not significant
enough to merit worst case analysis), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984); Save Lake Wash-
ington v. Frank, 641 F.2d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1981) (remote and speculative consequences
not included in EIS); Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1026 (9th
Cir. 1980) (remote and speculative consequences not included in EIS).
19861
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ties of occurrence were minimal." Consequently, concerns over the
dangers inherent in a project were elevated over the probability of
its occurrence.28 While this interpretation has some merit, it has
tended to initiate unlimited and somewhat exaggerated specula-
tion.29 One can always make a worst case "worse" by the addition
of factors that were not initially contemplated.3 0 For example,
would the occurrence of a nuclear meltdown in the middle of the
night be the worst case or would a meltdown on a summer after-
noon in close proximity to the beach be the worst case?3' Such
overly speculative scenarios have led to a line of decisions rejecting
the worst case analysis.2 While situations of low probability/cata-
27 See, e.g., San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287, 1302 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (worst case analysis required where probability of impact is assumed to be "very
small")(footnote omitted); Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir.
1984) (worst case analysis must consider spectrum of possible events); Southern Or. Citizens
Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir. 1983) (agency may not
omit worst case analysis even if believed unlikely), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 446 (1984). An
agency's contention that it need not analyze a worst case unless it is probable contradicts
the clear language of section 1502.22. Id. at 1479; see also Yost, Don't Gut Worst Case
Analysis, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,394, 10,395 (1983) (worst case analysis must address low
probability/severe consequences).
28 See Yost, supra note 27, at 10,395. The concerns over the severity of the environ-
mental impact as opposed to the probability of the impact have led to decisions to site
potentially hazardous projects in areas which minimize the impact. Id. "We do not site nu-
clear power plants in downtown Washington, D.C. or San Francisco, not because of what
will happen but because of what could happen." Id. (emphasis in original). In addition to an
analysis of a low probability/catastrophic impact, the worst case analysis would necessarily
include those impacts of higher probability but less catastrophic impact. See City of N.Y. v.
United States Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 753 (2d Cir. 1983) (Oakes, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984); Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 972 (5th Cir. 1983).
29 See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 145
(1981) (preparation of "hypothetical EIS" for proposed projects); Rosenbaum, Update: The
NEPA Worst Case Analysis Regulation, 14 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,267, 10,270-71 (1984) (worst
case analysis condemns agency to ask unending series of "what ifs").
30 See Proposed Amendment, supra note 8 at 32,236. The "limitless nature" of the
worst case inquiry has led one commentator to note "[ilt is not surprising that no one knows
how to do a worst case analysis." Id.
3' See McChesney, CEQ's "Worst Case Analysis" Rule for EISs: "Reasonable" Specu-
lation or Crystal Ball Inquiry?, 13 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,069, 10,073 (1983).
2 See, e.g., City of N.Y. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 752 n.20 (2d
Cir. 1983) (hard to imagine any agency action not subject to causing serious injury), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984); Save Lake Wash. v. Frank, 641 F.2d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1981)
(remote and conjectural consequences not required by NEPA); Warm Springs Dam Task
Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 1980) (remote or conjectural consequences
not required by NEPA). Some courts have not totally rejected the worst case analysis but
have severely limited the requirement where it is found that the agency has carefully stud-
ied the potential environmental impacts of the proposed action. See San Luis Obispo
Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 751 F.2d 1287, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
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strophic impact should be discussed in an EIS, the infinite specula-
tion that has been associated with a worst case analysis has under-
mined support for such discussion.33
THE 1986 VERSION OF SECTION 1502.22
Due to the criticism surrounding the worst case analysis, the
CEQ received numerous requests from both governmental and pri-
vate entities since 1983 to review and amend section 1502.22. 34 Af-
ter only one attempt to clarify the worst case analysis,35 the CEQ
acquiesced to these requests and proposed an amended version of
the regulation.3 6 In April of 1986, following comment from diverse
interest groups3 7 and further review, the CEQ published the final
version of section 1502.22 which no longer contained an explicit
worst case analysis requirement. 8
Southern Or. Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 446 (1984).
33 See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
31 See Amendment, supra note 8, at 15,619.
31 See id. at 15,620. Prior to the criticism which ensued in 1983, the CEQ offered guid-
ance concerning the worst case analysis only once. See Forty Most Asked Questions Con-
cerning CEQ's NEPA Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,032 (1981) [hereinafter Forty
Questions]. On August 11, 1983, the CEQ asked for comment concerning the worst case
analysis. Amendment, supra note 8, at 15,619. The draft suggested that an initial threshold
of probability should be reached before the section became applicable. See id. The response
was so varied the CEQ withdrew the proposal, deciding to give the matter further considera-
tion. See id.
" See Proposed Amendment, supra note 8, at 32,234. After discussion with federal
agencies and other interested parties, the CEQ concluded that due to its conjectural nature,
the worst case analysis was an unsatisfactory approach for an agency faced with uncertainty.
See id. at 32,236. This "indulgence in speculation for its own sake" was thought to be
counterproductive, causing agencies to invest substantial time and resources without appar-
ent beneficial results. Id. See Amendment, supra note 8, at 15,619-20 (discussion of public
comment process which led to amendment of 1502.22).
., See Amendment, supra note 8, at 15,620. The CEQ received 184 comments in re-
sponse to the proposed amendment, including comments from business and industry, pri-
vate citizens, public interest groups, federal agencies, state and local governments and a
member of Congress. Id.
38 See id. The amended version of section 1502.22 states:
When an agency is evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse ef-
fects on the human environment in an environmental impact statement and there
is incomplete or unavailable information, the agency shall always make clear that
such information is lacking.
(a) If the incomplete information relevant to reasonably foreseeable signifi-
cant adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives and the
overall costs of obtaining it are not exorbitant, the agency shall include the infor-
mation in the environmental impact statement.
(b) If the information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse
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Subsection (a)
In examining the text of the 1986 regulation, it is difficult to
discern any substantive difference between the opening paragraph
and subparagraph (a) of both regulations. Subsection (a) of the
1979 regulation remains substantially intact in that the regulation
still becomes applicable when an agency, preparing an EIS on a
major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, finds that there is incomplete or unavailable
information regarding environmental impacts. 3 The agency must
still disclose such lack of information in the EIS.40 The only sub-
stantive difference in subsection (a) is the 1986 addition of the
phrase "reasonably foreseeable" to modify "significant adverse
impacts." 41
Subsection (b)
The major textual difference between the two regulations oc-
curs in subsection (b). Section 1502.22(b) now requires a four-step
process whereby the agency must first disclose the fact that there
impacts cannot be obtained because the overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant
or the means to obtain it are not known, the agency shall include within the envi-
ronmental impact statement: (1) A statement that such information is incomplete
or unavailable; (2) a statement of the relevance of the incomplete or unavailable
information to evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts on
the human environment; (3) a summary of existing credible scientific evidence
which is relevant to evaluating the reasonably foreseeable significant adverse im-
pacts on the human environment, and (4) the agency's evaluation of such impacts
based upon theoretical approaches or research methods generally accepted in the
scientific community. For the purposes of this section, "reasonably foreseeable"
includes impacts which have catastrophic consequences, even if their probability
of occurrence is low, provided that the analysis of the impacts is supported by
credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the rule
of reason.
Id.
39 Compare 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1985) with Amendment, supra note 8, at 15,625; id. at
15,620-21. While there is no apparent textual difference between the opening paragraph and
subparagraph (a) of both regulations, CEQ points out that the terms "incomplete or un-
available information" or "unavailable information" are now to be considered as synony-
mous terms. See id. at 15,621. In addition, the Council notes that the changes in subsection
(a) are intended "primarily for the purpose of attempting to clarify and simplify the existing
requirements." Id.
10 Compare 40 C.F.R § 1502.22 (1985) with Amendment, supra note 8, at 15,625; id. at
15,621.
41 Compare 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1985) with Amendment, supra note 8, at 15,625; id. at
15,621.
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is incomplete or unavailable information.42 Second, the agency
must discuss why this lack of information is relevant to the evalua-
tion of reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts.43 Third,
a summary of the existing credible scientific evidence which is rele-
vant to evaluate the reasonably foreseeable significant adverse im-
pacts must be included." Finally, the agency's evaluation of such
impacts must be based upon theoretical approaches or research
methods generally accepted in the scientific community.4 A caveat
is placed at the end of the fourth requirement, requiring that the
term "reasonably foreseeable" shall include low probability/cata-
strophic impacts, provided that the analysis of the impact is sup-
ported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjec-
ture, and is within the rule of reason.46 The language of the former
subsection (b), requiring a worst case analysis, has been removed
from the 1986 revision of section 1502.22.4  While the requirement
of a worst case analysis has been formally removed from the regu-
lation, it is within the agency's discretion to include a worst case
analysis for those impact statements which were in progress during
the promulgation of the amended regulation.48
Effect of Revision of Section 1502.22
The CEQ has hailed the revised section 1502.22 as substan-
tially different from the original regulation, concluding that the re-
vision provides a wiser and more manageable approach to the eval-
uation of reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts when
there is incomplete or unavailable information. 49 This Note will
suggest, however, that the removal of the worst case analysis re-
quirement and the addition of the "rule of reason" and "low
42 See Amendment, 51 Fed. Reg., supra note 8, at 15,625.
43 See id.
4 See id.
15 See id. In evaluating the potential impacts, an agency is encouraged to specify which
of the impacts are the most likely to occur. See id. at 15,625.
41 See id. at 15,625-26.
', See id. at 15,621; compare 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1985) with Amendment, supra note
8, at 15,625.
4 See Amendment, 51 Fed. Reg., supra note 8 at 15,626. The CEQ states that the
amended regulation is applicable to all environmental impact statements for which a Notice
of Intent, see 40 C.F.R. § 1508.22 (1985), is published on or after May 27, 1986. See Amend-
ment, supra note 8 at 15,626. "For environmental impact statements in progress, agencies
may choose to comply with the requirements of either the original or amended regulation."
Id.
40 See Amendment, supra note 8, at 15,620.
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probability/catastrophic impact" requirements will not substan-
tially affect those agencies preparing an EIS when faced with in-
complete or unavailable information. It is submitted that the legis-
lative history, policies and case law surrounding NEPA, the
judicial interpretations of the worst case analysis, and public policy
considerations as well as a fair reading bf the revised regulation
underscore the importance of the worst case analysis, and mandate
its continued central role in the NEPA process.
THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF THE WORST CASE ANALYSIS
Legislative History and Policies Underlying NEPA
Modern technological advances have intensified a trend to-
ward environmental degradation." In response to this trend, Con-
gress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
("NEPA").51 The primary purpose of NEPA was to promulgate a
national policy which harmonizes technological growth with envi-
ronmental considerations.5 2 A theme of environmental protection
1o See H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2751, 2753 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT 378]. The House Report defines the
present environmental problem: "The problem is deep, and it touches on practically every
aspect of everyday life: economic, scientific, technological, legal, and even interpersonal
.... [iut is a problem which we can no longer afford to treat as of secondary importance."
Id.
Senator Henry Jackson, the principal proponent of the National Environmental Policy
Act ("NEPA"), concluded: "we do not intend, as a government or as a people, to initiate
actions which endanger the continued existence or the health of mankind." 115 CONG. REC.
40,416 (1969). For a thorough discussion of the legislative history of NEPA, see Murchison,
Does NEPA Matter? An Analysis of the Historical Development and Contemporary Signif-
icance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 18 U. RICH. L. REv. 557, 558 (1984).
" Pub. L. No. 91-190, Title I, § 102, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4361 (1982)) [hereinafter 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1982)]; see H.R. CON. REP. No. 765, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2751, 2768-69.
In recognition of the "profound" impact that man has on the environment, Congress
"declare[d] that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government... to use all practi-
cable means and measures . . . in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general
welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in produc-
tive harmony ... ." 42 U.S.C. § 4331(A) (1982); see also Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823,
834 (2d Cir. 1972) (NEPA protects quality of life), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); 40
C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (1985) (NEPA is basic national charter for protection of environment).
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982). Section 4321 states:
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy which will en-
courage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to
promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understand-
ing of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and
to establish a Council on Environmental Quality.
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pervades the act.5 3 Section 4332 of NEPA makes the responsibility
to preserve and enhance the environment applicable to federal
agencies. 54
Although NEPA outlines substantive goals for the nation as a
whole, its mandate to federal agencies is essentially procedural.55
The procedural requirements set forth in section 4332 serve a dual
purpose.56 First, these requirements ensure that an agency consid-
ers environmental issues before undertaking any major environ-
mental action.57 Second, the requirements serve to inform the pub-
lic that the agency has considered these environmental concerns in
Id.
53 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1982) (emphasizing profound human impact on all com-
ponents of environment); id. § 4332(A) (utilize approach which insures integrated use of
natural sciences, social sciences and environmental design arts in planning and decisionmak-
ing which impact on man's environment). See generally HousE REPORT 378, supra note 50,
at 2751-67 (purpose, legislative background and need for environmental legislation). The
theme of environmental protection and preservation is further indicated by the six goals of
NEPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(B) (1982).
U See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982). Section 4332 provides that the policy and public law of
the United States is to be interpreted and administered in accord with NEPA. See id. §
4332(1). To that end, all agencies of the Federal Government are directed to utilize a sys-
tematic, interdisciplinary approach in decisionmaking which may impact on the environ-
ment; to develop methods and procedures to insure that environmental values are given
appropriate consideration in decisionmaking; and to include an EIS in every proposal for
legislation and other major federal action. See id. § 4332(2).
11 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). There is a
direct relationship between the substantive and procedural goals of NEPA. It has been
noted that while the "strictures of NEPA are procedural in character.. .[t]hey ensure solici-
tude for the environment through formal controls and thereby help realize the substantive
goal of environmental protection." North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 598 (D.C.
Cir. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589 (1980); see also Comment, NEPA's Role
in Protecting the Environment, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 353, 356 (1982) (preparation of EIS is
procedural, designed to ensure fully informed decisionmaking).
I, See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983); Weinberger v.
Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981); Sierra Club v.
Clark, 774 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1985); City of Aurora v. Hunt, 749 F.2d 1457, 1465-66
(10th Cir. 1984). One court has referred to the dual purpose of NEPA as the process of
raising and disclosing environmental impact issues. Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Grib-
ble, 565 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1977).
67 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978). The
Vermont Yankee Court stated, "[t]he object [of NEPA] is for an agency to make a decision
only upon which it is fully informed and only after the decision has been well-considered."
Id.; see also Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 985 (9th Cir.
1985) ("purpose of NEPA is to assure that federal agencies are fully aware of the impact of
their decision on the environment"); Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Transp., 753 F.2d
120, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("purpose of the Act is to require agencies to consider environmen-
tal issues before taking any major action"); Comment, supra note 1, at 83-84 ("NEPA en-
sures federal agency will not undertake major project without first considering environmen-
tal consequences").
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its decision making process.5 8 It is submitted that the worst case
analysis is well-grounded in NEPA policy, since neither the deci-
sionmaker nor the public can be fully informed unless a worst case
analysis, where applicable, is included in the EIS. This position is
supported by case law construing NEPA prior to the worst case
regulation, case law interpreting the worst cases analysis, and
statements by the CEQ itself.
Case Law Under NEPA
Courts have consistently held that the worst case analysis is a
codification of NEPA case law.59 In the seminal case interpreting
NEPA requirements, Scientists' Institute For Public Information,
Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission ("SIPI"),s° the court consid-
ered whether the Atomic Energy Commission's ("AEC") failure to
file an EIS regarding its nuclear reactor program was a violation of
NEPA 1 The SIPI decision stated that the AEC was not relieved
of its responsibility to prepare an EIS even though the effects of
the breeder reactor were unknown . 2 Rather, the basic thrust of an
agency's responsibility under NEPA is to. predict the environmen-
tal effects of a proposed action before the action is taken. 3 To the
" See Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1029 (2d Cir.
1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 776 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1985). The agency "must set forth
sufficient information for the general public to make an informed evaluation," 701 F.2d at
1029, as well as make diligent efforts to involve the public. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (1985).
There are some cases, however, where public disclosure of an environmental impact is not
feasible due to considerations of national security. See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of
Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 142-43 (1981). Weinberger involved the proposed
construction of ammunition and weapons storage facilities, capable of storing nuclear weap-
ons, in Hawaii. Id. at 141-42. Information concerning the facilities, however, was classified
for national security reasons, therefore, it was unknown whether nuclear weapons were actu-
ally kept at the facilities. Id. Although rejecting the need for the Navy to prepare a "hypo-
thetical EIS," see id., the Court concluded that if the Navy proposed to store nuclear weap-
ons at the facilities, an EIS must be prepared for internal purposes, even though it was not
to be disclosed to the public. See id. at 146. "The Navy must consider environmental conse-
quences in its decisionmaking process, even if it is unable to meet NEPA's public disclosure
goals .. " Id.
" See, e.g., Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1984); South-
ern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984); Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 971 (5th Cir. 1983);
National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States Forest Serv., 592 F. Supp. 931, 942-43 (D. Or.
1984).
60 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
1 See id. at 1082.
02 See id. at 1091-92.
0" See id. at 1092.
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extent that reasonable forecasting and speculation were deemed
implicit in NEPA, the SIPI court contended that the discussion of
future environmental effects within the EIS must not be rejected
as "crystal ball inquiry. '64 Although the SIPI court did not specifi-
cally require the agency to prepare a worst case analysis, it is ap-
parent that a worst case analysis was intended.65
Case Law Interpreting the Worst Case Analysis
Cases that interpret the worst case analysis concur in the pro-
position that this analysis is well-grounded in NEPA policy.6 6 The
first United States Court of Appeals case to interpret the worst
case analysis was Sierra Club v. Sigler.7 In Sigler, environmental
groups concerned with the preservation of Galveston Bay, which
serves as a nursery for fish and wildlife habitat, sought to enjoin
the Army Corps of Engineers from transporting oil by supertanker
through the Bay.6 8 The Fifth Circuit required that the Corps pre-
pare a worst case analysis discussing the effect that a major oil
spill would have on the Bay. 9 Noting that NEPA demands reason-
able speculation regarding potential risks, the court concluded that
the Corps' interpretation that no worst case analysis was required
in this situation rendered the NEPA process ineffective.70 While
admitting the speculative nature of the worst case analysis, the
court concluded that its interpretation complied with the plain
6" See id.
" See Amendment, 51 Fed. Reg., supra note 8, at 15,625. The CEQ stated that case law
prior to the promulgation of section 1502.22 required agencies "to describe the reasonably
foreseeable environmental impact[s]" in the face of unavailable information. Id. (citing
SIPI, 481 F.2d at 1092). "The 'worst case analysis' requirement was a technique adopted by
the CEQ as a means of achieving the goals enunciated in such case law." Id. The CEQ notes,
however, that the worst case analysis per se was clearly an innovation on its part. See id.
(citing Comment, New Rules for the NEPA Process: CEQ Establishes Uniform Procedures
to Improve Implementation, 9 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,005, 10,008 (1979)).
'6 See Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 972 (5th Cir. 1983). The Sigler court noted
that, "there is ... some support for a worst case analysis in NEPA's legislative history which
illustrates congressional awareness of man's limited understanding of the environmental
consequences of his actions." Id. at 970 n.9.
07 Id.
18 See id. at 961.
"' See ia. at 968.
70 See id. at 974. The Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court's finding that an envi-
ronmental impact statement need not discuss speculative consequences. See id. The court
held "the fact that the possibility of a total cargo loss by a supertanker is remote does not
obviate the requirement of a worst case analysis .. " See id.
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language of the regulation and with NEPA as well.7
The Sigler court maintained that, at a minimum, NEPA re-
quires an EIS to contain information sufficient to alert the public
and the decision maker to all known possible environmental conse-
quences.71 In keeping with that requirement, an agency must pre-
sent, to the fullest extent possible, the spectrum of events that
may result from the agency's actions and the potential conse-
quences for the environment.7 The Sigler court determined that
the imposition of an affirmative duty on an agency to exceed the
limits of currently available information when necessary for an in-
formed decision is a major innovation and improvement in the EIS
process. 74 Cases decided subsequent to the Sigler decision over-
whelmingly concur with the proposition that these policies of
NEPA support the inclusion of a worst case analysis in an EIS
when an agency is faced with uncertainty.75 In fact, past state-
ments by the CEQ itself support the conclusion that NEPA policy
requires a worst case analysis. 76
Statutory Language of NEPA
The worst case analysis is not only supported by the policies
of NEPA, but it is also generally supported by the language of
"' See id. at 971.
72 See id. at 972.
73 Id. To illustrate, the Sigler court asserted that an agency, in presenting the spectrum
of possible events, should discuss low probability/catastrophic impacts as well as "events of
higher probability but less drastic impact." Id. (citations omitted). The Court stated:
For example, if there are scientific uncertainty and gaps in the available infor-
mation concerning the numbers of juvenile fish that would be entrained in a cool-
ing water facility, the responsible agency must disclose and consider the possibil-
ity of the loss of the commercial or sport fishery. In addition to an analysis of a
low probability/ catastrophic impact event, the worst case analysis should also
include a spectrum of events of higher probability but less drastic impact.
Id. (quoting Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's NEPA Regulations, 46 Fed.
Reg. 18-026, 18-032 (1981)).
71 See id.
75 See Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 1985);
Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1984); Southern Oregon
Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark 720 F.2d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984).
71 See Forty Questions, supra note 35, at 18-032. It is a minimum requirement of
NEPA to alert the public and Congress to all known possible environmental consequences.
See id. The CEQ states that the most important obligation of the federal government is "to
present to the fullest extent possible the spectrum of consequences that may result from
agency decisions, and the details of their potential consequences for the human environ-
ment." Id.
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NEPA itself." According to section 4332(c) of NEPA, a threshold
question which must be answered affirmatively before an EIS is
required is whether the agency proposes to undertake a major fed-
eral action which significantly affects the quality of the human en-
vironment.78 The statute,. however, does not define "significant. '7 9
Resolution of this substantive issue has traditionally been left ex-
clusively to the agency proposing the action,"0 with the result that
the term "significant" is defined on an ad hoc basis."' In consider-
ing the significant impact requirement under NEPA, reviewing
courts consistently describe "significant impact" in absolute terms,
requiring that an agency discuss "every" significant environmental
impact.82 A worst case accident would indisputably be a "signifi-
cant impact" within the meaning of section 4332(c).83
'" See Sigler, 695 F.2d at 969.
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1982). Numerous cases support the proposition that a sub-
stantial or significant risk to the environment triggers the requirement of an EIS. See, e.g.,
Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 1985); Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 587 (9th Cir. 1985); Texas
Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Marsh, 736 F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 1984); City of N.Y. v.
United States Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 745 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1055
(1984); Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1099 (1984).
7' See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1982). The CEQ, in defining "significant,"
states that "[tihe degree to which the possible effects on the human environment are highly
uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks" should be taken into account. 40 C.F.R. §
1508.27(b)(5) (1985). One reviewing court has described these guidelines as offering "little
help." River Rd. Alliance, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 764 F.2d 445, 450
(7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986); see also San Luis Obispo Mothers for
Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 751 F.2d 1287, 1302-03 n.77 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (CEQ
regulations not persuasive authority).
'o See Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Sierra
Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1029 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984)). Prior to preparation of the EIS, the agency must consult with
other agencies which have jurisdiction or special expertise in the area considered. 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(c)(1985); see Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 n.15 (1976).
" See, e.g., Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 987 (9th Cir.
1985) (federal project conforming to existing land use patterns, zoning or local plans sup-
ports finding of no significant impact); Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Transp., 753
F.2d 120, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (cumulative noise differences of one decibel not usually signif-
icant); NRDC v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (licensing
nuclear power plant significant impact), rev'd on other grounds sub noma. Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
82 See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983)(agency must factor
in all significant environmental risks); Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 972 (5th Cir.
1983)(disclosure of all known environmental consequences of agency action) (citations
omitted).
81 See Sigler, 695 F.2d at 973 (total cargo loss by supertanker is significant adverse
impact).
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Judicial Review of NEPA
While NEPA does not specifically provide for judicial review
of agency actions affecting the environment,84 judicial review is im-
plicit in the statute due to its vague wording. 5 Acknowledging that
courts do not possess the technical expertise of an agency, review-
ing courts have afforded great deference to agency determina-
tions, 6 particularly when the uncertain information is "at the fron-
tiers of science. '87  The reviewing court will not question the
procedures employed by an agency, provided that the agency com-
plied with its own rules and applicable statutes.88 An agency's in-
8 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1982). While sections 4333 through 4335 spe-
cifically address agency compliance, they do not address the issue of judicial review. See id.
§§ 4333-4335; Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 772 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d
Cir. 1985); San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 751 F.2d
1287, 1293-94 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. United States Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 299 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); Oregon
Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 614 F. Supp. 657, 660 (D. Or. 1985).
85 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973);
see also Comment, supra note 55, at 356 (NEPA's exceedingly general language invites judi-
cial review).
86 See Sierra Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1985). The agency decision
making process has traditionally been afforded a high degree of deference and a presump-
tion of validity. See Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 772 F.2d 1043, 1051
(2d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). This policy of deference by the courts is consistent with
the concept of federalism where the court may not "interject itself within the area of the
executive as to the choice of the action to be taken." Id. at 1051 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra
Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)). "Congress has excluded the courts from the fact-find-
ing process and any attempt to turn the clock back and renew the contest by reinsinuating
the judiciary into the area now reserved to executive expertise should be sharply rejected."
772 F.2d at 1051.
87 Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983); see also San Luis
Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRDC, 751 F.2d 1287, 1293-94 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (great defer-
ence due expert determinations of agencies); cf. Carstens v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
742 F.2d 1546, 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (courts must be deferential when reviewing scientific
determinations of agency) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2675 (1985); Stop H-3
Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1455 (9th Cir. 1984) (court does not possess technical expertise
of agency), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2344 (1985). Due to modern technological advances, the
courts are now asked to review agency decisions concerning "sophisticated data." City of N.
Y. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 736 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1055 (1984). For this reason, a court must be reluctant to reverse an agency's expert opinion.
See Carstens, 742 F.2d at 1557 n.17. To illustrate, the Carstens court stated that, "[t]he
uncertainty of. . .earthquake prediction. . . serves to emphasize the limitations of judicial
review and the need for greater deference to policymaking entities." Id. at 1557.
" See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978). The
Vermont Yankee Court indicated "that a totally unjustified departure from well-settled
agency procedure of long standing" may merit judicial intervention. Id. at 542.
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terpretation of its own regulation is of controlling weight89 as long
as environmental impacts are reasonably considered.90 Under the
present standards of review, an agency may be arguably "wrong"
in its determination regarding uncertain impacts, but its decision
to pursue the project would be sanctioned by the court in the name
of judicial deference.91 Thus, the danger that too much or too little
weight will be accorded to situations of low probability/cata-
strophic impact is presented,92 and this situation reinforces the
need for the disclosure contained in the worst case analysis.
It does not seem adequate to hope that an agency will volunta-
rily include a worst case analysis without a requirement to do so.
In light of the purposes of NEPA,93 neither the decision maker nor
the public can be fully informed of the impacts of the project un-
less the agency has carefully considered all reasonably foreseeable
environmental impacts94 in a detailed EIS. The inclusion of a
worst case analysis in an EIS is, therefore, proof that the agency
81 Cf. City of Aurora v. Hunt, 749 F.2d 1457, 1461-62 (10th Cir. 1984). Unwarranted
judicial intervention into the agency decision making process would severely hamper the
administrative process. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548.
90 See Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 772 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir.
1985) (ensure agency considered environmental consequences); Friends of Endangered Spe-
cies, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 1985) (decision must be fully informed and
well-considered); Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1461 (9th Cir. 1984) (environmen-
tally informed choice), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2344 (1985); Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch,
718 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1983) (consider environmental consequences), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1099 (1984); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(agency
must acquire and digest useful environmental information).
91 See North Slope Borough, 642 F.2d at 599. As long, as the agency followed a discern-
ible path in its decision making process, that is, conformed to the court's standard of review,
the court will uphold a decision of "less than ideal clarity." Sierra Club v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 772 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir. 1985).
92 See NRDC v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983). "When
faced with uncertainty concerning an environmental effect, an agency could evade its obliga-
tions under NEPA simply by finding that the effect will not occur." 685 F.2d at 479-80.
1: See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
9' See NRDC v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983); Town
of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984);
Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1091 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). The view that all reasonably foreseeable impacts are to be discussed in an EIS is
supported by CEQ guidelines which state: "NEPA requires that impact statements, at a
minimum, contain information to alert the public and Congress to all known possible envi-
ronmental consequences of agency action." Forty Questions, supra note 35, at 18-032 (1981)
(emphasis added). The emphasis, however, is on environmental impacts, not every possible
consequence of an agency's action. Glass Packaging Inst. v. Regan, 737 F.2d 1083, 1091
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1035 (1985).
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engaged in careful deliberation.95 Inasmuch as an agency must dis-
cuss the environmental impacts of a proposed action commensu-
rate with the significance of the impact,96 all low probability envi-
ronmental impacts should be discussed, however briefly, including
a worst case analysis.
AMENDED REGULATION PARALLELS INTERPRETATIONS OF WORST
CASE ANALYSIS
The rationale underlying the worst case analysis parallels the
language of the 1986 revision of section 1502.22 indicating that, de-
spite claims to the contrary, a worst case analysis is still required
when an agency is faced with uncertainty. The CEQ alleges that
the 1986 regulation is an improvement over the earlier worst case
analysis requirement because an agency is now required to base its
evaluation of unavailable information on credible scientific evi-
dence.17 This allegation blatantly ignores worst case analysis case
law. Reviewing courts have consistently stated that agencies need
not go beyond the state of the art technology in preparing a worst
case analysis. 9 In fact, NEPA has never demanded an agency to go
96 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Catholic Action for Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S.
139, 143 (1981) (EIS shows agency took environmental considerations into account); Sierra
Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 772 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2d Cir. 1985) (EIS is
proof agency engaged in careful deliberation); Sierra Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th
Cir. 1985) (EIS furnishes public with relevant environmental information); City of Aurora v.
Hunt, 749 F.2d 1457, 1465-66 (10th Cir. 1984) (EIS informs public that decisionmaking pro-
cess included environmental concerns); Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29, 34 (2d
Cir. 1983)(EIS evidenced agency considered reasonably foreseeable environmental effects
before undertaking action), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984). The EIS assures that "stub-
born problems or serious criticisms have not been 'swept under the rug.'" Sierra Club v.
United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1029 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Strycker's
Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (role of court to assure that
agency considered environmental consequences of action)(citations omitted); Sigler, 695
F.2d at 970 (reject attempt by agency to shirk responsibility under NEPA); North Slope
Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 599 (D.C. Cir.1980) (EIS ensures that agency takes good
"hard look" at potential environmental consequences); Save Lake Washington v. Frank, 641
F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981) (EIS performs primary function of presenting decision
maker with "environmentally-informed choice").
9 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (1985)(impacts discussed in proportion to significance);
see id. at § 1502.15 (data and analysis discussed commensurate with importance of impact).
The CEQ regulations state: "[t]here shall be only brief discussion of other than significant
issues.... [sufficient] to show why more study is not warranted." Id. § 1502.2(b) (emphasis
added). It is submitted that the term "other than significant issues" necessarily includes a
discussion of all reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts, however briefly discussed.
97 See Amendment, 51 Fed. Reg., supra note 8, at 15,621.
"9 See San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287, 1302 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1245 n.6 (9th Cir. 1984); Southern
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beyond presently known scientific data.9
In addition, the CEQ asserts that under the new regulation,
the agency is to be guided by a "rule of reason."100 Early case law
interpreting NEPA required an agency to be guided by the rule of
reason when preparing an EIS.101 Subsequently, reviewing courts
have followed suit, concluding that the rule of reason pervades the
NEPA process at all stages.10 2 Those cases which have interpreted
the worst case analysis are no exception.103 An agency has never
Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 446 (1984); Sigler, 695 F.2d at 974.
90 See Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 1985).
"NEPA does not require that we decide whether an EIR [under state law analogous to EIS]
is based on the best scientific methodology available, nor does NEPA require us to resolve
disagreements among various scientists as to methodology." Id. The agency is not required
to address remote and speculative consequences. See San Luis Opispo Mothers For Peace v.
NRC, 751 F.2d 1287, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621
F.2d 1017, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 1980); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Andrus, 619 F.2d
1368, 1375 (10th Cir. 1980).
o0 See Amendment, supra note 8, at 15,625-26.
101 See Scientists' Inst. For Pub. Information v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079,
1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The SIPI court stated:
Section 102(C)'s requirement that the agency describe the anticipated envi-
ronmental effects of proposed action is subject to a rule of reason. The agency
need not foresee the unforeseeable, but by the same token neither can it avoid
drafting an impact statement simply because describing the environmental effects
of and alternatives to particular agency action involves some degree of forecasting
..... 'The statute must be construed in the light of reason if it is not to demand
what is, fairly speaking, not meaningfully possible .... But implicit in this rule of
reason is the overriding statutory duty of compliance with impact statement pro-
cedures to the fullest extent possible.'
Id. (citations omitted).
102 See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978);
City of N.Y. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984); Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041,
1047 (1st Cir. 1982); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Citizens for Mass Transit, Inc. v. Adams, 630 F.2d 309, 313 (5th Cir. 1980). The case law
makes clear that the rule of reason governs judicial review of the preparation of an EIS. See
San Luis Obispo Mothers For Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1984). NEPA
"must be construed in the light of reason if it is not to demand what is, fairly speaking, not
meaningfully possible." Sigler, 695 F.2d at 970. In fact, NEPA "permits, even demands"
reasonable speculation. Id. at 974.
103 See, e.g., San Luis, 751 F.2d at 1302; Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605,
616 (9th Cir. 1984); Sigler, 695 F.2d at 970-71; North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d
589, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1980). .Under the well-established rule of reason, an agency need not
discuss in detail those impacts where the probability of occurrence is "inconsequentially
small." San Luis, 751 F.2d at 1300. "The Court must weigh the reasonableness of the worst
case analysis in light of its purpose of alerting the decisionmaker to the risks presented by
proceeding despite gaps in information." North Slope, 642 F.2d at 599. It is indeed possible
to create an informative worst case analysis which reasonably limits speculation. See Sigler,
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been required to go beyond the rule of reason when preparing a
worst case analysis, and therefore, the 1986 regulation adds noth-
ing new to guide an agency proceeding in the face of uncertainty.
Furthermore, the 1986 regulation describes "reasonably fore-
seeable" impacts as those which have catastrophic consequences
even if their probability of occurrence is low. 104 It is submitted that
the CEQ contradicts itself by removing the worst case analysis
from section 1502.22, but then stating that low probability/cata-
strophic impacts must be included in an EIS when there is uncer-
tainty. Low probability situations are exactly what the worst case
analysis is meant to address.105 An impact is deemed probable
when there is enough scientific data to make this determination of
likelihood. When sufficient scientific data is available, however,
section 1502.22 does not come into play at all for the section only
addresses incomplete or unavailable information situations.106 It is
asserted then, that since worst cases are, in actuality, low
probability situations by their nature because of such lack of infor-
mation, the revised regulation merely reinstitutes a worst case
analysis requirement despite the CEQ's claims to the contrary.
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Public policy considerations also dictate a conclusion that the
worst case analysis is still a valid and necessary part of the NEPA
process. An agency is no longer required, in an EIS, to weigh the
need for the proposed action against the risk and severity of the
possible adverse impacts.10 7 While certain risks are necessary for
695 F.2d at 974.
104 Amendment, supra note 8, at 15,625.
105 See Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark ("SOE"), 747 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1984);
Sigler, 695 F.2d at 971. The worst case analysis requires an analysis of a spectrum of events.
For instance, "[a] worst case analysis could discuss . . .a 1% chance of event X, a 10%
chance of event Y and a 20% chance of event Z .... SOE, 747 F.2d at 1245 n.7. A low
probability of occurrence does not obviate the need for a worst case analysis, for there can
still be a significant impact even if the probability of occurrence is low. See Southern Ore-
gon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir. 1983).
:06 See Amendment, supra note 8, at 15,620.
10" Compare 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1985) with Amendment, supra note 8, at 15,625-26;
id. at 15,621. The CEQ correctly concluded that a balancing test which weighs the need for
the proposed action against the risk and severity of the possible adverse impacts were the
agency to proceed in the face of uncertainty should take place after the EIS has been filed,
not during the preparation of the EIS. See id.; Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v.
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980); cf. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ.
Project, 454 U.S. 139, 146 (1981)("EIS need not be prepared simply because a project is
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the continuation of technological progress,108 society demands to
be informed of those which pose a threat to human life and the
environment. 0 9 It is clear that there are some risks which society
refuses to tolerate. 110 The public can only weigh these risks when
fully informed by the agency of the environmental consequences of
a proposed action."11 It is not unduly burdensome for an agency to
take these public policy considerations into account when prepar-
ing an EIS.112
contemplated"). There is also no "requirement to weigh the cost of obtaining the informa-
tion against the severity of the impacts, or to perform a cost-benefit analysis." Amendment,
supra note 8 at 15,622. These statements by the CEQ leave no doubt that an agency should
not engage in a balancing test within the EIS. Id.
108 See Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management
in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 335 (1985) (some risk advances public health and
safety); Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation,
33 VAND. L. REv. 1281, 1281 (1980)(society desires fruits of technological progress).
10" See City of N.Y. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 736 (2d Cir.
1983)(public consciousness raised over mixed blessing of progress), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1055 (1984).
110 Cf. Industrial Union, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 655
(1980). For example, one in a billion odds that a substance will cause cancer might not be
considered significant, but one in a thousand odds might be considered significant thereby
requiring appropriate steps to decrease or eliminate that risk. See id.
I See Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 772 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2d Cir.
1985). It is necessary for the public to "weigh the project's benefits against its environmen-
tal costs." Id.; see Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29, 39 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984). The legislative history surrounding NEPA expresses the con-
cern over man's abuse of his environment which underlies the need for the public to be
informed of the environmental consequences of proposed actions. Illustrative of this concern
are the statements of Senator Jackson:
The expression "environmental quality" symbolizes the complex and interre-
lated aspects of man's dependence upon his environment. Most Americans now
understand, far better than our forebears could the nature of man-environmental
relationships ... the Nation has in many areas overdrawn its bank account in life
sustaining natural elements. For these elements - air, water, soil and living space,
technology at present provides no substitutes.
115 CONG. REc. 19,012 (1969).
The House Report regarding NEPA further amplifies this concern:
By land, sea, and air the enemies of man's survival relentlessly press their
their attack. The most dangerous of all these enemies is man's own undirected
technology. The radioactive poisons from nuclear tests, the runoff into rivers of
nitrogen fertilizers, the smog from automobiles, the pesticides in the food chains,
and the destruction of topsoil by strip mining are examples of the failure to fore-
see and control the untoward consequences of modern technology.
H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in, 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2751, 2753.
12 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1985); North Slope
Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 605 n.93 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Oregon Envtl. Council v.
Kunzman, 614 F. Supp. 657, 665 (D. Or. 1985); Comment, supra note 55, at 353 (NEPA
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Experience shows that worst case accidents do indeed occur
and for this reason the worst case analysis cannot safely be dis-
carded. 113 Although the CEQ has decided to remove the worst case
analysis from section 1502.22, all this really accomplishes is the re-
moval of the sensationalism of the worst case." 4 The amendment
cannot and does not, however, remove the underlying need for the
worst case analysis.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that, although the CEQ has recently removed
the worst case analysis from section 1502.22 when an agency is
faced with unavailable or incomplete information in preparing an
EIS, a worst case analysis is still an integral facet of the EIS pro-
cess. The legislative history, policy, language and case law sur-
rounding NEPA support this conclusion. In addition, the expecta-
tions under the worst case analysis as evidenced by the case law
interpreting the regulation directly parallel the language of the
amended version of 1502.22 indicating that there is no significant
difference between the two regulations. Finally, public policy con-
designed to ensure actions of federal government reflect environmental concerns as well as
political and economic pressures).
Agencies are accorded a great deal of deference by the courts in preparation of an EIS.
See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text. There are also a number of other hurdles to
overcome when challenging an agency's decision. Standing is a prerequisite to judicial re-
view of an agency's action. Glass Packaging Inst. v. Regan, 737 F.2d 1083, 1087 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 509 (1984). Unless the damages alleged by the plaintiff are "within
the zone of interest to be protected by [NEPA]," the court cannot reach the merits of the
claim. Id. In addition, "[A]ll plaintiffs must demonstrate an actual or threatened injury
caused by the allegedly illegal conduct of the defendant which can be fairly traced to the
challenged action and which is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Id. (citations
omitted). The plaintiff must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence and
not merely prove a prima facie case. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 818 (5th Cir.
1975); Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982, 992 (5th Cir. 1974).
,13 See City of N.Y. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 753 (2d Cir. 1983)
(Oakes, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984). It should be noted that:
'[W]orst-case' accidents have a way of occurring - from Texas City to the Hyatt
Regency at Kansas City, from the Tacoma Bridge to the Greenwich, Connecticut,
1-95 bridge, from the Beverly Hills in Southgate, Kentucky, to the Cocoanut
Grove in Boston, Massachusetts, and from the Titanic to the DC-10 at Chicago to
the 1-95 toll-booth crash and fire ....
Id. See Yost, supra note 27, at 10,395 (worst cases are improbable but not inconceivable and
in some cases not very improbable).
"14 See Amendment, 51 Fed. Reg., supra note 8, at 15,624. The CEQ states that the
amended regulation is a less sensational approach to an EIS. See id.
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siderations demand an agency to include a worst case analysis in
the preparation of an EIS.
Melissa P. Corrado
